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1.

Introduction

In the years since the terrorists' attacks on 11 September
2001 (9/11), the United States (U.S.) has engaged in what
U.S. attorney general Eric Holder recently characterised as
an 'armed conflict' with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 1 This armed conflict generated a host of thorny
legal problems, some of which are of first impression. In particular, the fact that the adversaries the United States has
confronted in this timeframe are mainly non-state actors has
been one of the key complicating factors in the application of
international humanitarian law (IHL) or, as I prefer, the international law of armed conflict (ILOAC).
Do we need new rules to address questions like the status of
non-state actors in 21st century conflicts? Although as discussed below, the administration of President Barack Obama
has called for U.S. ratification of some existing ILOAC and
ILOAC-related agreements, there have been no formal requests by the U.S. government for additional ILOAC agreements. Can we then assume that the U.S. has found ILOAC
as it exists today adequate? Or are there other reasons which
diminish America's appetite for developing new ILOAC
agreements?
Although as a retired American officer I cannot speak for the
U.S. government, the purpose of this short presentation is to
provide my personal views as to (1) whether certain possible
proposals for ILOAC additions genuinely serve U.S. interests, and (2), even if so, whether it is probable that they - or
any - proposed changes could gamer the necessary U.S. domestic public and political support. This essay will attempt
to provide context for considering - and anticipating American approaches to these questions.
In general, this paper will conclude that the answer to both
queries is no. This essay takes the position that existing law
adequately serves U.S. interests, even if American interpretations of ILOAC do not always find consensus in the international community. This is not to suggest that, objectively,
there are not areas worthy of further clarification or even revision; rather, I am simply assessing the likelihood of any
such changes being so demonstrably in the U.S.'s interest as
to raise reasonable expectations that an accord acceptable to
the U.S. political process could be reached in the foreseeable
future. Although formal agreements may not be forthcoming,
the paper will offer suggestions for approaches that may be
useful for America and like-minded nations to consider furthering the cause of ameliorating the risk to civilians in war.
2.

Context

There is little doubt that ILOAC has become increasingly
important in the 21st century, and has significantly affectedindeed, many would say, complicated - the conduct of military operations. 2 As former North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
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tion (NATO) commander General James Jones observed,
warfare has now become "very legalistic and very complex",
requiring "a lawyer or a dozen." 3 Exactly why this phenomenon has emerged is worthy of a separate article, but suffice
to say it parallels a rise in the importance of international law
generally.
I believe that the growth of globalised commerce has necessitated a growth of international law and international forums in order to create and maintain investor confidence in
international trade. 4 This has raised the world's consciousness, so to speak, of international law. As has always been
the case, what happens in the commercial arena inevitably
spills over into the domain of war. History has shown us, for
example, how civilian-sector industrialisation operated to
transform first commerce and, eventually, the conduct of
war. Now law - much influenced by the impact of the civilian-sector information revolution - is changing the conduct
of war, even if the nature of warfare remains immutable.
Furthermore, as I have written elsewhere,5 law has become,
for want of a better term, 'weaponised', in that some belligerents are attempting to use it as a kind of asymmetric
war-fighting capability. In this situation, law becomes a substitute for orthodox military means to achieve effects which,
strategically speaking, can be indistinguishable from those
sought from more traditional military methodologies, a phenomenon I call 'lawfare'.
Though lawfare can take many forms, U.S. adversaries often
seek to exploit allegations of illegality to gain victories that
they fail to win on conventional battlefields - if not in real
courts, then in the so-called courts of public opinion. Consider what Professors Michael Riesman and Chris T. Antoniou point out in their 1994 book, The Laws of War: "In
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modem popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict
requires a substantial base of public support. That support
can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy
the political objective, if people believe that the war is being
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way." 6
Thus, in an era of instant communications especially, incidents of illegalities such as the detainee abuse scandal at Abu
Ghraib can have a disastrous effect on military operations,
and one that can persist. General David Petraeus has said,
"Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradable. They don't go away. The enemy continues to
beat you with them like a stick." 7 So adherence to the law,
and especially ILOAC is essential, not just for its own sake,
but for purely pragmatic, military reasons.
As a result, American military commanders are increasingly
cognisant of the decisive importance of law,8 and how vital it
is for operations to be conducted in adherence to it in fact
and - equally important - in appearance. This is why the recent allegations of troop misconduct in Afghanistan are disconcerting to them: not only because they represent breaches
in discipline, but also because they are well aware that such
actions can further complicate the accomplishment of their
mission.
This consciousness of the importance and value of international law is not limited to U.S. military commanders, but
also extends to the larger American polity. Contrary to what
seems to be a rather widespread myth, Americans do not
eschew international law generally. In fact, the U.S. has supported a considerable body of public and private international
law.9 Admittedly, this official support has a significant measure of self-interest. As Harold Koh, the legal advisor to the
U.S. State Department, has said, "obeying international law
promotes U.S. foreign policy interests and strengthens our international leadership." 10 Thus, he adds, the "United States'
active participation in international tribunals and other international bodies formed an important part of our practice.""
Nowhere, however, does he call for additional ILOAC rules.
What Koh does say is that: "In the area of the law of armed
conflict, the United States continue[s] to place priority on ensuring that its detention operations, detainee prosecutions,
and operations involving the use of force - including those in
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces - are consistent with all applicable law, including
international law." 12
Thus, he puts the U.S. squarely behind the proposition that
U.S. military operations must (and do) comport with
ILOAC. Notably, U.S. support ofILOAC is not limited to official pronouncements by government officials like Koh. A
very recent analysis of polling data shows that the American
body politic supports many international treaties that impact
ILOAC, to include those that "impose constraints on the use
of force and coercion." 13 Indeed, polls even show that a
"large majority also favors having an international body,
such as a court, to judge compliance with treaties to which
the United States is party." 14

3.

Americans and ILOAC-Related Agreements

Broad public support for ILOAC principles generally does
not, however, necessarily translate into support for specific

ILOAC-related agreements that may seem to compromise
American interests. A classic example is the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal Court (ICC).15
Although an early supporter of the ICC, the U.S. objected to
the final version of the statute.
Not only did the U.S. Congress refuse to ratify it, it also
passed legislation in 2002 entitled the American Servicemembers Protection Act. 16 Among other things, this Act took
the unprecedented step of enshrining in law authority for the
President "to use all means necessary and appropriate to
bring about the release of any [U.S.] person [ ... ] being
detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of
the International Criminal Court." 17 In support of this legislation, the Congress made on-the-record findings that the
Rome Statute: "[P]urports to establish an arrangement
whereby United States armed forces operating overseas
could be conceivably prosecuted by the international court
even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by the
treaty. Not only is this contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the United
States to use its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian
interventions to save civilian lives. Other contributors to
peacekeeping operations will be similarly exposed." 18
The Congress had other concerns as well. It found that if
U.S. troops were tried by the ICC, they would be "denied
procedural protections to which all Americans are entitled
under the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution,
such as the right to trial by jury." 19 In an era in which the
U.S. relies upon an all-voluntary military to serve in complex circumstances in any and every comer of the globe, it
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may be even more important to assure those who do serve
that they will not be abandoned to a foreign forum which
does not adhere to basic standards of U.S. constitutional law.
Currently, however, U.S. objections to the ICC focus primarily on concerns about the definition of the crime of aggression. At the international review conference in Kampala,
Uganda, in 2010, the parties decided to delay implementation of the crime of aggression until 2017, an action supported by the U.S. It appears that serious U.S. consideration
of the treaty will have to wait until then. Still, according to
the U.S. State Department's Harold Koh, "Even as a nonState party, the United States believes that it can be a valuable partner and ally in the cause of advancing international
justice." 20
Interestingly, advocacy by the U.S. Department of Defense is
no panacea. For example, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 21 has languished in the legislature despite explicit and long-standing military support
for it. 22 Objections have varied over the years, but recently
opponents have argued that with "China emerging as a major
power, ratifying the treaty now would encourage SinoAmerican strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and do nothing to resolve China's expansive maritime territorial
claims." 23 In short, political opposition to UNCLOS seems
to remain strong.
All of this should illustrate how difficult it can be to obtain
the necessary consensus in the United States when an international treaty has security implications. This is not to say
such agreements are impossible to achieve: the recent renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)24 despite controversy 25 is an important example, as is the ratification - in 2008 - of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 26 Rather, it
is to acknowledge that they almost always have the potential
to breed controversy in the U.S., and frequently can be resolved only after very lengthy negotiations, if ever.
Of the several treaties pending before the U.S. Senate for
ratification, 27 the one with direct ILOAC relevance is Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 28 Ironically, when this
protocol (which addresses certain non-international armed
conflicts) was originally considered in the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan's administration, it was criticised as
insufficiently expansive. 29 Now, however, the Obama Administration enthusiastically backs its ratification. 30 Before
discussing potential issues with ratification, a little background about American attitudes towards the Geneva Conventions may be appropriate.
According to William Leitzau, the U.S. Department of Defense's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Policy, the U.S. is "committed to the Geneva Conventions
and to educating our citizens of its provisions and protections ."31 Leitzau adds that "[w]e are at a time in history when
the importance of International Humanitarian Law in general, and the Geneva Conventions in particular, cannot be
overstated." 32 Still, despite such official pronouncements, it
is nevertheless true that many Americans are not as familiar
with the Geneva Conventions as they may think they are, and
many hold views that may be inconsistent with them.
In February of 2011, for example, the American Red Cross
conducted two polls, one of adults aged 18 and older, and an-
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other of youth from 12-17 years old. Asked whether they
were familiar with the Geneva Conventions, 55% of adults
believed they were, but only 19% of youth shared the same
belief about themselves. Additionally, according to the
American Red Cross, the survey found that: 1. A majority of
youth (59%) - compared to 51 % of adults - believe there are
times when it is acceptable to torture the enemy. 2. More
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than half of youth (56%) believe that there are times when
it is acceptable to kill enemy prisoners in retaliation if the
enemy has been killing American prisoners, while only 29%
of adults agree. 33 3. 41 % of youth believe there are times
when it is acceptable for the enemy to torture captured American prisoners, while only 30% of adults agree.
Obviously, even those adult Americans who do claim familiarity with the Geneva Conventions nevertheless approve, at
least at certain times, of activities that breach them (for
instance with respect to torturing the enemy "to get important military information") .34Additionally, 51 % of the adults
in that poll found it was always or sometimes acceptable to
refuse visits to prisoners "by representative of a neutral organization to ensure [the prisoners] are being treated well," 35
something that may also be inconsistent with Geneva Convention requirements.
Arguably, these contentious views might represent not so
much any sort of generalised rejection of the Geneva Conventions, but more of a reflection of the trust, confidence,
and deference accorded members of the armed forces and a
reluctance to micro-manage what they may need to do in particular instances during wartime. Notwithstanding the occasional scandal or other well-publicised misdeed, Americans,
it seems, believe their military will 'do the right thing' in difficult situations.
Bear in mind that in the U.S., the armed forces occupy a
special, almost revered place in the American psyche. For
the past several years polls show that the military is, for
example, considered the most trusted institution in American
society. 36 Moreover, a 2010 poll showed military leaders in
specific as being tops in public confidence. 37 Likewise, according to another poll, Americans consider military officers
second only to nurses as the profession having the highest
honesty and ethics.38
To be sure, the popularity of the armed forces does not make
them above criticism, but it does tend to cause civilians to be
deferential to military judgments about operational matters.
In fact, in the U.S. even the courts seldom second-guess military leaders. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that
"it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity
in which the courts have less competence" than in the "complex, subtle, and professional decisions" military officers
must make. 39 Even civilian juries, when confronted with
allegations of military misconduct in combat, can feel inadequate to the task if they are required to question the judgment
of what those in uniform did in combat.
The case of former Marine sergeant Jose Luis Nazario offers
an illustration. In explaining his acquittal in a 2008 trial in
civilian court of charges related to the killing of four civilians
in Iraq, "several jurors acknowledged that they also did not
feel qualified to judge a Marine's actions in the midst of a battle."40 One said "she hoped the verdict would send a message
to the troops in Iraq." 41Reportedly, she wanted the troops to
"realize that they shouldn't be second-guessed, that we support them and know that they're doing the right thing." 42
Given the pragmatism and deference in American thinking
about the conduct of military operations, let us return to the
Obama administration's proposal to ratify the Protocol II of
the Geneva Conventions. The administration says that an
"extensive interagency review concluded that United States

military practice is already consistent with the Protocol's
provisions." 43 This rationale may, however, legitimately
raise questions about the utility of ratification.
For example, if the U.S. is already adhering to the underlying
rationale, what would be the purpose of making such adherence binding up on military commanders and others? Would
it not be wiser, given the unknowability of the circumstances
of future battlefields, to forgo an agreement that would limit
or eliminate discretion? It seems that the administration's
answer is that it believes that ratification would "not only
assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the international community in developing the law of armed conflict,
but would also allow us to reaffirm our commitment to
humane treatment in, and compliance with legal standards
for, the conduct of armed conflict." 44
It is difficult, however, to find convincing, objective evidence that U.S. ratification of Protocol II or, for that matter,
any other ILOAC agreement would matter much in terms of
foreign public's perceptions of America. And it is likewise
hard to find much evidence that Americans are much concerned about foreign perceptions of themselves. Of course, it
can only inure to the U.S.'s benefit that, for example, the
Pew Research Center reported in July 2011 that "in most
regions of the world, opinion of the United States continues
to be more favorable than it was in the Bush years." 45
Nonetheless, it may very well be that most Americans think
much as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates does. In
the aftermath of the Wikileaks disclosure of a huge amount
of U.S. classified material, Gates dismissed the fears of
many pundits who thought the leaks would irreparably harm
U.S. foreign relations. Gates' comments went well beyond
the immediate issue of the Wikileaks case when he said:
"The fact is governments deal with the United States because
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it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because
they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep
secrets. Many governments - some governments - deal with
us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most
because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been
said before, the indispensable nation." 46
Such thinking is not without critics. As one commentator
rather nastily put it, many U.S. politicians and others "believe that principles of international relations somehow do
not apply to the United States and that America is so different from other nations that it doesn't have to pay attention to
what other people think." 47 While this view may be rightly
criticised - and probably is an overstatement - it nevertheless rings true enough to be worthy of consideration in assessing the degree to which foreign pressure might induce
the U.S. to enter into ILOAC agreements not manifestly in
its interests.
The fact is that Americans are willing to go their own way, so
to speak, when security is involved - and this has not
changed despite costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed,
Americans remain prepared to use force when necessary, despite the fact that in December of 2011 66% said that they
oppose the war in Iraq 48 and in March of 2012 it was reported that 60% of Americans believe the war in Afghanistan
was not "worth it." 49President Obama may have quite accurately captured the attitude of many Americans when he
declared in 2011 that: "It's true that America cannot use our
military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and
risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests
against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument
for never acting on behalf of what's right." 50
Americans do understand that their view is not always
shared by others. For instance, they overwhelmingly approve
of certain counterterrorism activities that are quite controversial in many other parts of the world. Specifically, a poll conducted in early February of 2012 found that "the sharpest
edges of President Obama's counterterrorism policy, including the use of drone aircraft to kill suspected terrorists abroad
and keeping open the military prison at Guantanamo Bay,
have broad public support [ ... ]". 51 In another poll, in March
2012, a majority of Americans were found to support "taking
military action against Iran if there is evidence that Iran is
building nuclear weapons even if it causes gasoline and fuel
prices in the United States to go up." 52
Such support for military action is not, however, undifferentiated. For example, a 2010 poll found that 79% of Americans believe that the "U.S. is playing the role of world
policeman more than it should be." 53Accordingly, it should
not be surprising that as of March of 2012, more than twothirds of Americans did not think the U.S. has a responsibility to act regarding the ongoing fighting in Syria, 54although
two-thirds also "approve of the idea of the Arab League and
Turkey establishing safe havens inside Syria." 55
Americans' inclination to think in terms of their own security
interests does not mean that they reject collaborative efforts
with other nations. For example, a 2011 poll found that eight
out of ten Americans thought "it is important that the United
States maintain an active role within the United Nations"
even though a majority (51 %) thought the United Nations
(UN) was an "only somewhat effective" organisation. 56

124

4.

ILOAC Controversies

It is certainly true that there are controversies and uncertainties in the ILOAC realm that would benefit from clarification. Yet it is hard to see where, realistically, there is much
prospect for agreements that would not restrict or even compromise what many Americans steadfastly view as essential
to U.S. security. In this regard, it may be helpful to review
the U.S. position with regards to Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention, a key ILOAC agreement to which the
U.S. is not yet a party.57
Although the Obama administration has not detailed its
views, it has reconfirmed that it "continues to have significant concerns" with the Protocol.5 8 In 1988, Abraham D.
Sofaer, then legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State,
explained the U.S.'s failure to become a party: "The reasons,
spelled out in a detailed JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] report of
more than a hundred pages, include the fact that the Protocol
grants irregulars a legal status which is at times superior to
that accorded regular forces; that it unreasonably restricts
attacks against certain objects that have traditionally been
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legitimate targets; and that it eliminates significant remedies
in cases where an enemy violates the Protocol." 59
It is quite possible that U.S. views have not only remained
unchanged since 1988, but even become more solidified by
the experience with 'irregulars' in the conflicts since 9/11. In
particular, the international community has not been especially successful in compelling compliance with ILOAC by
such non-state adversaries, and too often has focused its opprobrium on the U.S. merely because - it sometimes seems it takes such criticisms seriously, as is so often not the case
with America's opponents.
One of the most serious ILOAC issues is civilian casualties,
but there is scant indication that additional rules would help
limit them. In February 2012 the report of the United Nations
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that in
2011, the Taliban and other anti-government forces were responsible for 77% of the civilian deaths. 60After noting that
the Taliban claimed to have a policy against targeting civilians, UNAMA concluded that: "UNAMA welcomes any
public pronouncement of Taliban policy on reducing civilian
casualties but asserts that such rules are only meaningful if
implemented on the ground. Despite the Taliban's improved
messaging on protection of civilians in 2011, UNAMA did
not document improved compliance with international
humanitarian law by the Taliban or a reduction in civilian
casualties caused by them. The Taliban continued to directly
target civilians and use indiscriminate weapons such as pressure-plate IEDs [improvised explosive devices]." 61
While it may be helpful to think about new regulations in
ILOAC, Americans are more disposed to think about enforcing the existing rules in a fair and equitable manner. In fact,
in the Red Cross poll noted above, 57% of Americans
endorsed "strengthening the enforcement of laws and rules
that limit what combatants can do in war." 62 In the case of
the Taliban anyway, it appears that there is yet much work to
do within the existing framework.
Moreover, U.S. efforts to neutralise the source of the vast
majority of civilian deaths have often been criticised on the
basis of an interpretation of ILOAC with which it does not
agree. I am talking here about the U.S.'s much-debated use
of drones. It is beyond the scope of this essay to address that
debate substantively, but in a series of speeches, U.S. government officials have repeatedly laid out the American position on drones, and in each case they asserted that the use of
drones is clearly in conformance with existing international
law. 63
That others may have a different opinion does not necessarily render the U.S. interpretation suspect. In discussing,
whether international law permits a drone strike against a
threat in a country that is "unwilling or unable" to do anything about it, Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith admits
that international law is "not settled" on the point, but insists:
"[l]t is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no
American president charged with keeping the country safe
could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights
when presented with a concrete security threat in this situation that no American president charged with keeping the
country safe could refuse to exercise international selfdefense rights when presented with a concrete security threat
in this situation."6 4

In any event, what incentive would the U.S. have to seek a
new ILOAC agreement that might 'settle' the issue in a way
that could compromise, from an American perspective, the
responsibilities of the President to keep the country safe?
Besides, as already mentioned, rank and file Americans
strongly support the drone campaign. 65 And media reports
indicate it is effective. According to one article, material reportedly obtained from Osama Bin Laden's lair in Pakistan
showed "frustration with the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency] drone campaign" because al-Qaeda operatives were
"getting killed faster than they could be replaced." 66 More
recently, another media report said that Bin Laden warned
followers of "the importance of the exit from Waziristan,"
apparently because of the drone operations, as he importuned
his followers to "[c]hoose distant locations to which to move
[ ... ] away from aircraft photography and bombardment." 67
Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to welcome any proposals that
might complicate or even compromise the legal basis for using the capability that, in the U.S. view, has so debilitated the
principal cause of civilian deaths from terrorism since 9/11.
Of course, clarification as to the status of non-state actors
would seem to be useful for the U.S. given the nature of the
conflicts in which it has been engaged in recent years. However, in light of the experience with the Interpretive Guidance issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) about the status of civilians who directly participate
in hostilities, there is little to suggest that the U.S. would
benefit substantively from any international effort. 68
As Professor Robert Chesney of the University of Texas
notes, that guidance argues "that members of organized
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armed groups (OAG) who perform a continuous combat
function (CCF) in a [non-international armed conflict] are
not civilians and may be targeted in a manner comparable to
that of a combatant, not just when engaging in specific acts
of direct participation." 69Chesney speculates (but admits he
does not have confirmation) that the U.S. government may
interpret "category of targetable fighters in a fashion that is
broader than the ICRC's CCF test." 70
What is known is that the Interpretive Guidance has proven
to be highly controversial. The exact delineations of the controversy are beyond the scope of this essay, but Professor
Michael Schmitt, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, offers a critique of the Guidance that resonates with this writer and
other Americans. 71He sees international humanitarian law as
seeking to "infuse the violence of war with humanitarian
considerations." In doing so, however, he says it "must remain sensitive to the interest of states in conducting warfare
efficiently, for no state likely to find itself on the battlefield
would accept norms that place its military success, or its survival, at serious risk." 72
According to Schmitt, the "very delicate balance between
two principles: military necessity and humanity undergirds
virtually all rules of IHL and must be borne in mind in any
effort to elucidate them." 73Schmitt then contends that: "It is
in this regard that the Interpretive Guidance falters. Although
it represents an important and valuable contribution to understanding the complex notion of direct participation in
hostilities, on repeated occasions its interpretations skew the
balance towards humanity. Unfortunately, such deviations
from the generally accepted balance will likely cause states,
which are ultimately responsible for application and enforcement of the law, to view the Interpretive Guidance skeptically."74
Considering that the U.S. is a nation that "finds itself on the
battlefield" with relative frequency, it is troubling that the
ICRC, the non-governmental organisation most influential in
the development of ILOAC, seems to be unbalancing the
necessary symbiosis in this critical area. Its interpretations
could provide U.S. authorities with a strong rationale against
engaging in any process that might further memorialise
analyses with the potential, in the U.S. view, to disrupt the
proper understanding of international law, including ILOAC.
Other reasons argue against the U.S. becoming interested in
new ILOAC rules, even where clarification might be helpful.
For example, one might think cyberwar would be a fertile
area for new ILOAC regulations. Many countries (not just
the U.S.) are grappling with the many technical and policy
issues associated with cyber incidents, not the least of which
are the thorny legal issues. In particular, the question of what
constitutes a prohibited use of force under the United Nations Charter, 75or as it is more commonly captioned, 'what
constitutes an act of war' in the cyber domain, is a frequent
query. A closely related and recurrent issue is what kind of
cyber activity would constitute an 'armed attack' within the
meaning of the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the
Charter. 76
However, the divergence of views about the nature and scope
of cyberwar militate against any reasonable hope of achieving an ILOAC-level agreement in the foreseeable future.
Journalist Tom Gjelten observes that "[d]ifferent ideas of the
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cyber danger around the world illustrate that countries vary
in the way they perceive their own vulnerabilities." 77 He also
goes on to warn: "While peace accords and disarmament
agreements are attractive, however, democracies have reason
to proceed cautiously in this area, precisely because of differences in the way cyber "attacks" are being defined in international forums. Russia, which for more than a decade has
been promoting a global cyber arms control agreement,
would like to criminalize what Soviet diplomats once called
"ideological aggression", and China and allied governments,
especially in the Middle East and Africa, share this view." 78
At least two reasons exist for a lack of optimism about a
global cyber agreement. First, as Gjelten implies, such an
agreement could be used by some non-democratic states to
crush dissent, a result that the U.S. would doubtless disfavour. In fact, a senior State Department official said that
China and Russia "seek to justify the establishment of sovereign government control over internet resources and over
freedom of expression in order to maintain the security of
their state." 79
Secondly, Gjelten argues that with respect to the U.S. armed
forces, "no other military has such an advanced offensive
capability for cyber war." 8 Consequently, he says, under "a
comprehensive cyber arms limitation agreement, the United
States would presumably have to accept deep constraints on
its use of cyber weapons and techniques." 81Plainly, there is
little incentive for America to accept such constraints, especially if such restrictions would also operate to suppress free
speech in non-democratic states.
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Space is yet another area that would seem ripe for more
extensive ILOAC treatment. Again, however, the U.S. is
arguably the premier space-faring nation, so it is not clear
how a new agreement could avoid putting legal fetters on a
U.S. capability already extant, and in which it enjoys an
asymmetric advantage over potential foes. Nevertheless, the
U.S. does see the value in collaboration, and has recently
joined with the European Union and other nations to develop
a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities. 82 This could be an important first step.
According to the U.S. State Department, the agreement will
be "focused on the use of voluntary and pragmatic transparency and confidence-building measures to help prevent
mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space." 83 At the
same time, the Department insists that the administration "is
committed to ensuring that an International Code enhances
national security and maintains the United States' inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense, a fundamental
part of international law" and adds an important caveat that
syncs with the long-standing U.S. view: the "United States
would only subscribe to such a Code of Conduct if it protects
and enhances the national and economic security of the
United States, our allies, and our friends." 84
While not truly an ILOAC agreement, and obviously one
that lacks the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions, the
Code does represent the kind of agreement that is achievable
in an area of growing importance, and one with significant
security implications. The references to "maintain[ing] the
United States' inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense," as well as the statement that U.S. subscription to
the Code is conditioned on its actually "enhancing" U.S. security (as opposed to merely maintaining or even memorialising the status quo) appears to be instructive as to what
predicates are necessary for American involvement in proposals for new ILOAC rules.

5.

Concluding Observations

This essay may paint a discouraging picture for those who
believe that additional ILOAC rules may ameliorate the impact of war on civilians. It would seem that American support for such proposals is uncertain at best, and that the U.S.
is largely satisfied with its interpretations of existing law.
There does not appear to be a strong counter-narrative that
would encourage optimism about a change in this status quo.
New rules may not, however, be the only way to further minimise civilian suffering in conflict. The greater availability
and wider use of precision munitions is an example of a development that may operate as effectively to protect civilians
as new ILOAC rules, and would be something that the U.S.
could support. Polls show that Americans - 80% in fact very strongly support the idea of increasing the "accuracy of
weapons to reduce unintended casualties." 85
Unfortunately, this method of achieving the same purpose as
that desired by many advocates of additional ILOAC rules the protection of civilians - may not be acceptable to America's allies, including those in NATO. Precision munitions
are costly, and procuring them at a time of budgetary austerity can be contentious. Yet inadequate inventories also can be
costly in terms of human lives if they are not available when

needed. Recall that during the Libya operation it was reported that military leaders of the six NATO nations that provided combat aircraft "openly complain[ed] that they are
running out of smart bombs" because procurement of them
had been limited by budget cuts. 86
Clearly, NATO countries - which, on average, spend only
1.7% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense 87 do not give defense spending the priority that the U.S. does,
even though the accuracy of expensive American weaponry
may protect civilians in wartime at least as much as ILOAC
does. This seeming uneven sharing of the burden is having
an effect on the American perspective. In stinging 2010
speech former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: "The
blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and
patience in the U.S. Congress - and in the American body
politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on
behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the
necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be
serious and capable partners in their own defense. Nations
apparently [are] willing and eager for American taxpayers
to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in
European defense budgets." 88
Many might understandably consider these to be hard - and
to an extent, unfair - words to direct towards friends and
allies, but they do suggest an important reason why it is
unlikely that Americans would evince a particular interest
in new ILOAC regulations. Americans, who spend 4.8% of
GDP on defense, 89 are not likely to be disposed to embrace in
the near term any new ILOAC regulations - even emanating
from friendly countries - absent evidence of an equal willingness, as Secretary Gates says, to devote the necessary
resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and
capable partners in their own defense.
To reiterate, Americans do strongly support international
law, and especially ILOAC. They take their obligations under applicable law very seriously, and recognise that there
are areas where clarifications of ILOAC might be helpful.
That said, they are quite wary of new agreements or rules,
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Thema
and especially those that may, in practice, serve more as a restraint on U.S. actions than on those who the U.S. opposes
and who violate existing ILOAC regulations with regularity.
In 1988 Abraham Sofaer (while still the U.S Department of
State legal advisor) observed that: "The approval of the
United States should never ·be taken for granted, especially
when an agreement deals with national security, the conduct
of military operations and the protection of victims of war."90
In this writer's opinion, these words are as relevant in
analysing the American mindset today as they were when
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uttered a quarter-century ago. While the U.S. would no doubt
be open to discussing ILOAC proposals, those who may
want to propose them would be well-served by cultivating a
keen appreciation of the American perspective, even if that
perspective is not fully shared by America's closest friends
and most treasured allies.
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